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MARTIN

V. GRAVIS (#1237)

ATTORNEY AT LAW

2562 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 392-8231

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
Case No.
MICHAEL MARTINEZ,

Defendant/Appellant.

JUDGE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
THIS IS

AN APPEAL from the denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained
through an illegal search. The defendant is charged with possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, first degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8(l)(al(iii),
possession of dangerous weapon by restricted person, class A pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
76-10-503(3)(b), possession of a controlled substance, class B pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
58-37-8(2)(d), Interfering with arrest, class B pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 76-8-305,
redlight violation, class C pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 41-6-24 and possession of drug
paraphernalia, class B pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 58-37a-5(l). A motion to Suppress was
held on October 25, 2004 and the Court issued it's decision on November 29, 2004. This Court
has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
DID THE Trial Court correctly interpret Utah Code Annotated Title 41-6-166 in holding
1

that an officer can arrest a person for a violaiton of 41-6-etseq. Without showing that any of the
four exceptions allowed by Utah Code Annotated 41-6-166 exist and therefore is the search
incident to arrest a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution and Article I
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Lower Courts interpretation of of statutes are reviewed for
correctness. State v. Pixton 2004 UT. App 275, 98 P 3d 433. Utah Constitution Art. I Section 14
Utah Code Annotated
41-6-166. Appearance upon arrest for misdemeanor-Setting Bond.
"Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this [chapter 6]1 punishable asa
misdemeanor, the arrested person, for the purpose of setting bond, shall in the following cases be
taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense
charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of such offense and is
nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where said arrest is made in any of the
following cases:
(1) When a person arrested demands and immediate appearance before a magistrate.
(2) When the perosn is arrested upon a charge of driving or beingin actual physical
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination thereof as
prescribed in Section 41-6-44.
(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in the event of an accident
causing death, personal injuries, or damage to property.
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to
appear in Court as hereinafter provided, or when the discretion of the arresting officer, a written
promise is insufficient."
and all statute on crimes listed.

1

"... the reference to 'this act' should now properly be read 'this chapter,' meaning chapter 6."

Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1201.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

WEBER-MORGAN

Narcotics Strike Force agents Grogen and Johnson testified at the

suppression hearing.
On the night of June 16, 2004, Agents Grogen and Johnson were conducting surveillance
of an Ogden house following complaints of drug trafficking. The agents set up in a school
parking lot across the street from the house with two other agents. The agents were not in
uniform and each drove an unmarked vehicle.
During the course of the evening, the agents observed Martinez leave the house under
surveillance on a motorcycle. Martinez crossed the street to the parking lot, circled the agents,
then committed several traffic violations while returning to the house, namely, failing to stop at a
stop sign and giving a right hand turn signal while turning left.
After several minutes, Martinez left the house a second time and proceeded to drive the
motorcycle eastbount on Harrison Boulevard. Agent Johnson followed, and observed further
traffic violations by Martinez-failing to stop pursuant to a traffic control device and turning
without signaling at the intersection of 20 T H Street and Harrison Boulevard.
Agent Johnson initiated a traffic stop. Martinez stopped the motorcycle and dismounted.
Shortly thereafter, Agents Grogen and Weiss arrived at the scened. Agent Johnson stepped away
to check for a valid license and registration and outstanding warrants. Agent Grogen informed
Martinez that he was under arrest for the observed traffic violations. Martinez backed up as
though attempting to get away, but was restrained and handcuffed by Agents Grogen and Weis.
Believing that his assistance in restraining Martinez might be needed, Agent Johnson
reapproached Martinez, Grogen and Weiss. Agent Johnson observed a large bulge in the front
waistband area of Martinez pants. When initially stopped, Martinez had been carrying a large
sheath knife and butterfly knife. Agent Johnson asked Martinez what was in his pants. Agent
Johnson testified that he was concerned that the bulge might be a concealed weapon. Martinez
began to struggle and made an effort to hide the bulge from view. Agen Johnson searched
Martinez and removed a black case or pouch from Martinez' waistband area, which was found to
3

contain drug paraphernalia and substances appearing to be marijuana and methamphetamine.
Martinez was subsequently booked and charged by information with, among other things,
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §5837-8(l)(a)(iii).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

THE SEARCH of the defendant was illegal since he was arrested in violation of Utah Code
Annotated 41-6-166. He was arrested for a red light violation which is clearly a violatio of Utah
Code Annotated 41-6-et seq. And none of the four exception allows an officer to arrest and
individual for violation of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-et seq. were present.
ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE ARREST of the defendant was in violation of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-166 and
therefore the evidence obtained in the search incident to arrest should be suppressed
This issue was raised in the case of State v. Harmon, (854 P2d 1037 Utah App. 1993) 910
P2d 1196 (Utah 1995). In that case the Courts did not decide this issue since the defendant was
arrested for driving on suspension which is not a violation of 41-6-et sez.
In that case, the Court stated as follows:
These factors notwithstanding, we conclude that Harmon's arrest for driving on
suspension was not unreasonable in light of the governmental interest in removing unlicensed
drivers from the road for public safety reasons. Other jurisdictions have uniformly held that
driving on suspension is sufficiently serious to justify the offender's arrest rather that mere
detention and citation. See, e.g., State v. S.P., 580 S.2d 216, 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 592 So.2d 682 (1991); People v. Anderson, 169 111. App.3d 289, 120 111. Dec. 123, 129,
4

523 N.E.2d 1034, 1040, appeal denied, 122 I11.2d 579, 125 Ill.Dec.223, 530 N.E.2d 251 (1988),
Page 1204
cert denied, 490 U.S. 1036, 109 S.Ct. 1935, 104 L.Ed.2d 407 (1989); State v. Pierce, 136 N.J.
184, 642 A.2d 947, 958 (1994) (upholding arrest in part because driving on suspension "poses
grave danger to the public"); State v. Hollis, 161 Vt. 87, 633 A.2d 1362, 1364 (1993); State v.
Reding, 119Wn.2d685, 835 P.2d 1019, 1023 (1992) (overruling prior contrary authority). [fnlO]
Harmon has not identified, and we have not found, a single case where an arrest for driving on
suspension has been held to be unconstitutional.
This holding should be construed narrowly and does not necessarily apply to other traffic
violations. "It should be the policy of every law enforcement agency to issue citations in lieu of
arrest or continued custody to the maximum extent at 432(citing A.B.A. Standards Relating to
Pretrial Release §2.1 (Approved Draft, 1968)); see also Parker, 834 P.2d at 595 ("[I]t is difficult
to imagine any circumstances surrounding a routine traffic stop in which [an arrest] would be
justified."). As we stated in Lopez:
[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle
registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has
produced a valid driver's license an devidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, "he must be
allowed to proceed on his way, without being subjected to further delay by police for additional
questioning."
The trial court in this case did construe the law narrowly in holding that an officer can
arrest for a traffic violation at any time that the officer chooses. If an officer can arrest a traffic
offender at any time he chooses then Utah Code Annotated 41-6-166 is meaningless.

5

CONCLUSION

BASED UPON the

foregoing, the defendant respectfully request that this Court reverse the

denial of the Motion to Suppress.
DATED THIS 7

^

day of May, 2005.

UtfTN
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ADDENDUM

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING

Plaintiff,

vs.
Judge John R. Morris

MICHAEL LEROY MARTINEZ,

Case No. 041904034

Defendant.

This case is before the court on a motion to suppress.
FACTS
Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force agents Grogen and Johnson testified at the suppression
hearing.
On the night of June 16, 2004, Agents Grogen and Johnson were conducting surveillance of
an Ogden house following complaints of drug trafficking. The agents set up in a school parking lot
across the street from the house with two other agents. The agents were not in uniform and each
drove an unmarked vehicle.
During the course of the evening, the agents observed Martinez leave the house under
surveillance on a motorcycle. Martinez crossed the street to the parking lot, circled the agents, then
committed several traffic violations while returning to the house, namely, failing to stop at a stop
sign and giving a right hand turn signal while turning left.
After several minutes, Martinez left the house a second time and proceeded to drive the
motorcycle eastbound on Harrison Boulevard. Agent Johnson followed, and observed further traffic
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violations by Martinez-failing to stop pursuant to a traffic control device and turning without
signaling- at the intersection of 20th Street and Harrison Boulevard.
Agent Johnson initiated a traffic stop. Martinez stopped the motorcycle and dismounted.
Shortly thereafter, Agents Grogen and Weiss arrived at the scene. Agent Johnson stepped away to
check for a valid license and registration and outstanding warrants. Agent Grogen informed Martinez
that he was under arrest for the observed traffic violations. Martinez backed up as though attempting
to get away, but was restrained and handcuffed by Agents Grogen and Weiss.
Believing that his assistance in restraining Martinez might be needed, Agent Johnson reapproached Martinez, Grogen and Weiss. Agent Johnson observed a large bulge in the front
waistband area of Martinez pants. When initially stopped, Martinez had been carrying a large sheath
knife and a butterfly knife. Agent Jolinson asked Martinez what was in his pants. Agent Johnson
testified that he was concerned that the bulge might be a concealed weapon. Martinez began to
struggle and made an effort to hide the bulge from view. Agent Johnson searched Martinez and
removed a black case or pouch from Martinez' waistband area, which was found to contain drug
paraphernalia and substances appearing to be marijuana and methamphetamine.
Martinez was subsequently booked and charged by information with, among other things,
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(iii).
ANALYSIS
Martinez asks the court to suppress the evidence obtained upon search on the ground that a
peace officer's authority to arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation is limited by Utah Code Ann.
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§§41-6-166,-167 and -169. Martinez also argues that the arrest was improper since it was motivated
by the agents1 desire to search Martinez and his motorcycle, and that an arrest for a misdemeanor
traffic violation should fail on Fourth Amendment grounds.
A peace officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation
was raised but not decided in State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). In Harmon, the Utah
Supreme Court determined that sections 166 and 167 apply only to arrests for violations of title 41,
chapter 6, and therefore did not apply to the violation for which Harmon was arrested. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a peace officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest for
misdemeanor speeding violations without examination of section 41-6-166. United States v. Lugo,
170 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1999).
Statutory Authority to Arrest
Martinez asserts that a peace officer's authority to arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation
is limited by sections 41-6-166, -167 and -169. Those sections provide:
41-6-166. Appearance upon arrest for misdemeanor-Setting bond.
Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this [chapter 6]1 punishable as a
misdemeanor, the arrested person, for the purpose of setting bond, shall in the following cases be
taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged
is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of such offense and is nearest or most
accessible with reference to the place where said arrest is made, in any of the following cases:
(1) When a person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate.
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge of driving or being in actual physical control
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination thereof as prescribed in
Section 41-6-44.
1

u

... the reference to 'this act' should now properly be read 'this chapter/ meaning chapter 6."
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1201.
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(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in the event of an accident
causing death, personal injuries, or damage to property.
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to appear
in court as hereinafter provided, or when in the discretion of the arresting officer, a written promise
to appear is insufficient.
41-6-167. Notice to appear in court-Contents-Promise to comply-Signing-Release from
custody -Official misconduct.
(1) Upon any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor, whenever a person is [not]2
immediately taken before a magistrate as hereinbefore provided, the peace officer shall prepare, in
triplicate or more copies, a written notice to appear in court containing:
(a) the name and address of the person;
(b) the number, if any, of the person's operator's license;
(c) the registration number of the person's vehicle;
(d) the offense charged; and
(e) the time and place the person shall appear in court.
(2) The time specified in the notice to appear must be at least five days after the arrest of the
person unless the person demands an earlier hearing.
(3) The place specified in the notice to appear shall be made before a magistrate of competent
jurisdiction in the county in which the alleged violation occurred.
(4) (a) In order to secure release as provided in this section, the arrested person shall promise
to appear in court by signing at least one copy of the written notice prepared by the arresting officer.
(b) The arresting officer shall immediately:
(i) deliver a copy of the notice to the person promising to appear; and

"The word 'not' was included in the original 1941 bill but was accidentally omitted when the
bill was enrolled. See 1941 Utah Laws 139; 1949 Utah Laws 186. We have previously held that
'the only logical reading of the statute is that it has application only when a citation is issued in
lieu of an arrest and no appearance is made before a magistrate.' Woytko v. Browning, 659 P.2d
1058, 1061 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute should read 'whenever a person is
not immediately taken before a magistrate.'" Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1200, fn 6.
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(ii) release the person arrested from custody.
(5) Any officer violating any of the provisions of this section shall be:
(a) guilty of misconduct in office; and
(b) subject to removal from office.
41-6-169. Arrests without warrants.
The foregoing provisions of this act shall govern all peace officers in making arrests without
warrant for violations of this act, but the procedure prescribed herein shall not otherwise be exclusive
of any other method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an offense of
like grade.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-166, -167, 169.
Martinez contends that arrests for misdemeanor traffic violations are authorized in only the
four specific circumstances enumerated in section 166: (1) when the person arrested demands to see
a magistrate, (2) when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance,
(3) when arrested for hit and run, or (4) when the person arrested refuses to sign the promise to
appear contained in the citation or when, in the discretion of the officer, the written promise to
appear is insufficient.
For all misdemeanor traffic violations not within these four circumstances, Martinez argues
that section 169 gives peace officers authority only to issue a citation under section 167, after which
the suspect must be released.
However, neither sections 166, 167,169 nor the other provisions of title 41, chapter 6 confer
arrest authority on peace officers. That authority is found in Utah's general statute governing arrests,
which provides that cwa peace officer ... may, without warrant arrest a person: ... (I) for any public

Ruling
Case No. 041904034
Page 6 of 12
offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer... ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2
(emphasis added).
Furthermore, the authority to issue citations for misdemeanor traffic violations (other than
parking violations under section 41-6-19.5) is not found in those sections or anywhere in chapter 6.
That authority is also found in the general arrest statute: "A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person
into custody ... may issue and deliver a citation requiring any person subject to arrest or prosecution
on a misdemeanor or infraction charge to appear at the court of the magistrate before whom the
person should be taken pursuant to law if the person had been arrested." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-18
(emphasis added).
Sections 77-7-2 and 77-7-18 are both written in the permissive voice "may," and confer
authority on peace officers to arrest a suspect for any ''public offense" committed in their presence
or. in the peace officer's discretion, to cite the suspect for any "misdemeanor or infraction" for which
the suspect would otherwise be subject to arrest or prosecution.
It is uncontested that Martinez committed multiple misdemeanor traffic violations in the
agents' presence. Therefore, the agents were statutorily authorized to arrest or cite Martinez in their
discretion under sections 77-7-2 and 77-7-18.
Addressing Martinez' argument, the court must determine whether or not in certain
circumstances sections 166, 167 and 169 limit the general authority of a peace office to arrest, or
require the issuance of a citation instead of an arrest for a traffic misdemeanor. " . . . 41-6-169 mkes
[sic] it clear that the officer must make an arrest or issue a citation pursuant to the [sic] 41-6-166 and
41-6-167." (Defendant's Reply Memo, p. 2). The court concludes they do not.
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In construing sections 166,167 and 169, the "primary rule ... is to give effect to the intent of
the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. To discover that intent, we
look first to the plain language of the statute. In construing a statute, we assume that each term in the
statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused or inoperable." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,
Moreover, "[w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions
in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT
12, ^} 17. "It is our duty to construe each act of the legislature so as to give it full force and effect.
When a construction of an act will bring it into serious conflict with another act, our duty is to
construe the acts to be in harmony and avoid conflicts." Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773
(Utah 1991).
Sections 166, 167 and 169 presuppose that an arrest has taken place. Section 166 applies
"[wjhenever any person is arrested for any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor." That
section describes the procedure to be followed for appearance and setting bond once an arrest has
been made: the arrested person "shall... be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate" in
the enumerated circumstances.
Section 167 further describes the post arrest procedure to be followed "whenever a person is
[not] immediately taken before a magistrate as hereinbefore provided." The phrase "as hereinbefore
provided" can only refer to section 166, and the phrase "as hereinafter provided" in section 166(4)
can only refer to section 167. Read together, sections 166 and 167 impose a procedural requirement
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that persons arrested for misdemeanor traffic violations be taken to a magistrate "without
unnecessary delay" or, where not so taken before a magistrate, given a citation and released.
Section 169 requires that sections 166 and 167 be followed for warrantless arrests for traffic
misdemeanor violations under chapter 6. Specifically, section 169 imposes "the procedure prescribed
herein"-i.e., the post arrest procedures contained in sections 166 arid 167-where not in conflict with
other law.
For these reasons, the court reads sections 166, 167 and 169 as procedural rules for peace
officers to follow once an arrest has been made for misdemeanor traffic violations under chapter 6,
containing neither a grant of limited authority to arrest without warrant nor a restriction or limitation
of any such authority. Those sections are consistent with, and do not supersede, conflict with or
restrict a peace officer's general authority to make a warrantless arrest for any public offense
committed or attempted in the officer's presence under section 77-7-2.
The agents' statutory authority to arrest Martinez was not restricted or limited by sections
166,167 and 169. The arrest was therefore valid and the subsequent search was a search incident to
arrest.
Reasonableness of the Arrest
Martinez also raises issues under the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution, which
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. "He had a valid driver's license and there were no
warrants for his arrest and was a resident of Ogden but the officers did not even attempt to issue a
citation but instead arrested the Martinez solely for the purpose of searching him and his motorcycle
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and therefore the arrest was illegal and the evidence obtained should be suppressed." Defendant's
Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof, p. 2.
Martinez' first constitutional argument is that the "pretext doctrine" should invalidate his
arrest. That doctrine was rejected in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) (in the case of
temporary stops for traffic violations); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah), cert, denied, 114 S.
Ct. 476,126 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1993) (arrest for parole violation; however, the pretext doctrine was not
squarely before the court); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) (traffic stop and subsequent
arrest of a passenger for giving false personal information to a peace officer), and State v. Harmon,
910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995) (traffic violation outside chapter 6).
"In attempting to apply the pretext doctrine, [defendant] argues that her arrest was
unconstitutional because even if she 'could' have been arrested for driving on suspension, a
reasonable officer ... 'would' not have done so. After considering our opinions in Lopez, Archuleta,
and Pena, as well as cases from other jurisdictions, we conclude that the 'pretext arrest' analysis
should be rejected for many of the same reasons that we rejected the 'pretext stop* analysis. The
validity of an arrest must be analyzed on objective criteria, not on an officer's subjective motivations
or suspicions. Inquiring into 'what a reasonable officer would do' focuses on a question that is
falsely objective, 'fails to provide the consistency and predictability officers need,' and ignores the
possibility that usual police practice may be unconstitutional." Harmon, 91 OP.2d at 1206 (citations
omitted).
"If police have a valid right to arrest an individual for one crime, it does not matter if their
subjective intent is in reality to collect information concerning another crime. ... In other words, if
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the alleged pretext arrest could have taken place absent police suspicion of the defendant's
involvement in another crime, then the arrest is lawful. ... The arrest was not rendered invalid solely
because the officers had a separate motive for arresting him ... ." Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1238.
Martinez' second constitutional argument is directed to the reasonableness of his arrest.
Martinez concedes that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation
despite a Fourth Amendment challenge in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). "The State
has correctly stated the law under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but the
State of Utah can interpret its constitution to provide more protection from the government then [sic]
the United States Constitution provides, [citations omitted] Also, the legislature of the State of Utah
is free to provide greater protection then [sic] is provided by the U.S. Constitution and that is exactly
what 41-6-166 does by limiting when the police can arrest a person for a violation of a traffic
offense." Defendant's Reply Memo, p. 2. Martinez attempts to distinguish Atwater "since Texas law
provided the officer the right to arrest for that violation." Id.
The court does not find that Martinez' arrest was unreasonable under the Utah Constitution.
"In Lopez, we concluded that 'because the pretext doctrine is unsound, we refuse to adopt it under
article I, section 14 . . . of the Utah Constitution.' This holding also applies to pretext arrests."
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206 (citation omitted).
In construing statutes, the court will "avoid interpretations that conflict with relevant
constitutional mandates." State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 1995) "[W]e have a duty to
construe statutes to avoid constitutional conflicts." Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125
(Utah 1990).
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Under section 77-7-2, the agents had probable cause and authority to arrest Martinez for
observed misdemeanor traffic violations. The court interprets sections 166,167 and 169 as imposing
additional procedural requirements in connection with such arrests. Such procedures address possible
abuses of a peace officer's discretionary arrest authority.
"The purpose of the statute [chapter 6] is two-fold. First, it preserves the rights of a person
arrested by insuring that he be afforded a prompt opportunity to effect his release from custody.
Second, it prevents the arresting officer from being selective in determining before which magistrate
the charge will be lodged and tried." Woytko, 659 P.2d at 1060 (Utah 1983).
The reasonableness of warrantless arrests for misdemeanor traffic violations is therefore
addressed, and Martinez' rights are preserved, in the procedures applicable to such arrests as enacted
by the legislature in chapter 6, and specifically in sections 166, 167 and 169. Accordingly, the court
declines to invalidate arrests under the general arrest statute as applied to misdemeanor traffic
violations, or to impose additional procedures or analysis on such arrests.
CONCLUSION
Martinez' motion to suppress is denied.
Dated November 29, 2004.

Jdm R. Morris, Judge
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